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NOTES AND COMMENTS
rule to that effect, determined that the state rule conflicted therewith,
and by virtue of the supremacy doctrine held that the state rule could
not be applied.
CONCLUSION
It would seem that an injured seaman's attorney has a choice of
courses to pursue, and may stress any one or a combination of the three
doctrines, depending upon the position of his client. If, for instance, he
is seeking to prosecute an unseaworthiness claim (not joined with a
Jones Act count) after the local statute of limitations has run but before
three years had passed from the date of his injury, he could stress the
uniformity argument advanced by Justice Brennan, contending that the
three year limitation period of the Jones Act was intended to be applied
to all unseaworthiness actions, conjoined with a Jones Act count or not.
If, on the other hand, he is attempting to prosecute a claim before the
state statute has run, but after three years time, he could point out that
the holding of McAllister is confined to situations in which unseaworthi-
ness counts are joined with Jones Act counts and is therefore inapplicable
to his case. In either case he could probably successfully invoke the
"humanitarian" doctrine, contending in the first instance, that the Mc-
Allister decision was intended to give all maritime workers the benefit
of at least three years time in which to begin the prosecution of their
claims, and in the second instance that if he isn't allowed to prosecute his
claim beyond three years, as the state statute allows, he is being deprived
of "full benefit" of his federal right.
However, if supremacy and uniformity are to mean anything at all,
it is submitted that a court called upon to construe this decision should
use Justice Brennan's opinion as a guide, and strictly apply the three
year Jones Act limitation by analogy. The security to litigants, if not
deference to Congress, afforded by this approach would more than
justify giving such a "legislative" interpretation to the holding. Certain-
ly, in the light of the recent judicially-wrought metamorphosis of the
maritime law, it would cause few blushes.
ROBERT B. EVANS
Civil Procedure-Additur-Power of Court to Increase Jury Award
Generally, courts have long accepted remittitur1 as a procedural
device by which they can, with the plaintiff's consent,2 reduce the
'Neese v. Southern Ry., 350 U.S. 77 (1955) ; Gila Valley, G. & N. Ry. v. Hall,
232 U.S. 94 (1914) ; Blunt v. Little, 3 Fed. Cas. 760, No. 1578 (C.C.D. Mass., 1822) ;
New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Curtis, 264 Ala. 137, 85 So. 2d 441 (1955);
Stalicup v. Rathbun, 76 Ariz. 63, 258 P.2d 821 (1953); Hyatt v. McCoy, 194
N.C. 760, 140 S.E. 807 (1927); Tice v. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1956).
' Defendant's consent is not needed. If both plaintiff and defendant consent
to the judgment, the need for remittitur is eliminated and the court may enter
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amount of an excessive jury award as a condition to denying de-
fendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages.
They have, however, been reluctant3 to accept additur.4 Additur is a
procedural device by which courts, with the defendant's consent, in-
crease the amount of an inadequate jury award as a condition to denying
plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of inadequate damages.5
When the validity of additur is questioned in a jurisdiction which
permits the use of remittitur, three courses are open to the court: it
may (1) permit the use of additur in light of its accepted use of
remittitur,6 (2) deny the use of additur, yet allow the use of remittitur7
or (3) deny the use of additur with an indication that the use of remit-
titur will be denied in the future.
In the recent case of Caudle v. Swanson,8 additur received its first
examination by the North Carolina court. Plaintiff-builder brought
suit to recover the unpaid building costs of a house. The jury returned
a verdict of $6,192 for the plaintiff. The trial court found that the
award was inadequate, 9 and, with the defendant's consent, increased it
by $500. The plaintiff excepted to the use of this procedure, contending
that it deprived him of his right to trial by a jury as guaranteed by the
Constitution of North Carolina.10 Rejecting the plaintiff's contention,
the court approved the use of additur on the basis of its established
recognition of remittitur.11
The same constitutional objection as raised by the plaintiff in the
principal case is voiced by defendants in remittitur cases.12 In those
a consent judgment. King v. King, 225 N.C. 639, 35 S.E.2d 893 (1945) ; Jones v.
Griggs, 223 N.C. 279, 25 S.E.2d 862 (1943).
' Some states have provided for the use of additur by statute. See, e.g., R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. Ch. 23 § 9-23-1 (1956) ; WAs H. REv. CoDE § 4.76.030 (1952).
'This Note is limited to the use of additur in cases involving unliquidated
damages. An increase in damages by the court, in cases involving liquidated
damages, is not subject to the same criticism since in those cases the amount of
damages is fixed and the only issue for the jury is the fact of liability. Fornara v.
Wolpe, 26 Ariz. 383, 226 Pac. 203 (1924); Harris v. McLaughlin, 39 Colo. 459,
90 Pac. 93 (1907).
'Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350,
240 P.2d 604 (1952) ; Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957)
Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958).
' Genzel v. Halvorson, supra note 5; Bodon v. Suhrmann, supra note 5.
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. 2d 350,
250 P.2d 604 (1952).
8 248 N.C. 249, 103 S.E.2d 357 (1958).
' Generally, the plaintiff makes a motion for a new trial because of inadequacy
of damages and the court, as a condition to denial of this motion, accepts the
defendant's consent to the increased verdict. However, there is no indication in
the record that plaintiff made such a motion here.
"
0N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
" Cohoon v. Cooper, 186 N.C. 26, 118 S.E. 834 (1923) ; Isley v. Bridge Co.,
143 N.C. 51, 55 S.E. 416 (1906).
"2Arkansas Valley Land and Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889); Hughes
v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 2d 703, 180 P.2d 419 (1940) ; Sewell v.
Sewell, 91 Fla. 982, 109 So. 98 (1926) ; Henderson v. Dreyfus, 26 N.M. 541, 191
Pac. 442 (1919) ; Weatherspoon v. Stackland, 127 Ore. 450, 271 Pac. 741 (1928).
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cases, the court's answer is that the defendant has no right to complain
because the reduction benefits him by requiring him to pay less than the
amount awarded by the jury. By the same token, our court reasoned
that the plaintiff had no right to complain about the use of additur since
he was in fact benefited by its use.
It is argued that a trial by jury necessarily implies a trial by a
properly functioning jury.'3 Thus, if the trial court must increase the
jury award so that the damages will not be inadequate, it is obvious that
the jury has not functioned properly. And, though the plaintiff has
benefited by the use of the additur procedure, it is conceivable that a
properly functioning jury at a new trial might award greater damages
than those awarded with the use of the additur procedure.14  It is also
contended that a trial by jury includes a determination by the jury of
both the existence of liability and the amount of damages to be awarded.
When a court resorts to the use of additur, it cannot be said that the
jury determined the final amount of damages awarded.' 5 Has the
plaintiff had his right to a jury trial when the final amount of damages
awarded was found by the trial court and not by the jury?
In the principal case it was stated that the defendant waived his
constitutional right to trial by jury. by consenting to the use of the
additur procedure. The consenting defendant pays a reasonable amount
determined by the trial court; however, the non-consenting defendant
is faced with a new trial, additional expenses, and the gamble as to what
the new jury will award. Might it not be said that this is a legalized
coercive type consent? Of course, if there were no coercion it is
highly unlikely that defendants would consent.
The court in Caudle stated that if they held the trial court lacked the
power to increase the verdict by $500, they "would be required to
remand the case for a judgment upon the verdict in the sum of $6,192."''1
The implication of this language is that the court was of the opinion
that the original jury verdict was adequate or, at least, not so inadequate
as to warrant a new trial17 for abuse of discretion. Since the trial
court, by its use of additur, indicated that the verdict was inadequate,
would it not have been more accurate for the Supreme Court to have
'" Note, 21 VA. L. REv. 666 (1935).14 In Wisconsin, the defendant may prevent a new trial by consenting to an
increased verdict which equals the maximum amount of damages which could be
awarded as a matter of law. Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374
(1927) ; Note, 27 MARQ. L. Rzv.-86 (1943).11 Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. Q. 1 (1942).
16 248 N.C. at 261, 103 S.E.2d at 366.
"'x"While the judgment recites the trial court was of opinion that the amount
of damages awarded was inadequate, he did not exercise the power of discretion
vested in him to set the verdict aside on that ground, and, in our opinion, it cannot
be said that his refusal was an abuse of his discretion." 248 N.C. at 256, 103
S.E.2d at 362.
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said, instead, that if additur was improper they would remand the case
to the trial court for exercise of its discretion, and not for "judgment on
the verdict"?
As indicated above it appears that the additur procedure denies the
plaintiff his right to trial by jury; however, in light of the remittitur
precedent in North Carolina, our court's decision rests on logical
ground.
NIcK J. MILLER
Constitutional Law-Discretionary Power of the Secretary of State
to Deny Passports
The power of the Secretary of State to deny passports for reasons
other than those established by congressional legislation was rejected
by the Supreme Court in the recent case of Kent v. Dulles.' To under-
stand adequately the problem involved in that case it is necessary to
review briefly the historical and legal background of the present passport
laws.2
Originally, passports were issued by a multiplicity of federal, state,
and local officers.3 A statute4 enacted in 1856 and, with minor amend-
ments, codified in 1926 changed this practice. This statute remains the
basis of the present passport laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
"The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports . . .
under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe
for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person
shall grant, issue, or verify such passports."
The Secretary assumed that under this statute and the executive order
issued pursuant to it 5 he had the discretionary power to deny a pass-
port. Until recently that power had never been questioned. 6
1357 U.S. 116 (1958).
'This Note will deal with the Secretary's power to deny passports and with
the substantive grounds for such denial. It will consider only incidentally the
related problem of procedural due process in the denial of passports.
' See 357 U.S. at 123.
' 11 STAT. 60 (1856) (later amended by 44 STAT. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a
(1952)).
'Exec. Order No. 7856 (1938), 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.1-.77 (1958). This order
outlined certain procedural rules and in § 51.77 authorized the Secretary to promul-
gate additional regulations not inconsistent therewith.
' The first case mentioning passports in the Supreme Court was Urtetiqui v.
D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835), where the Court, in a frequently quoted
dictum, described the passport as a political document whose issuance was in the
sole discretion of the Secretary. Briefly stated, the basis of the viewpoint thus
expressed was that the inherent power of the Chief Executive to exercise sole
discretion in conducting foreign affairs encompassed the issuance of passports,
because the traveler's activities abroad might conflict with our foreign policy and
because the government was in some measure obligated to protect citizens abroad.
For a good exposition of this point of view, see Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561,
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